What is an Iaasac Wunder Order?
An Iasaac Wunder order is an order which can be issued by an Irish court, limiting the ability of a litigious individual to bring legal proceedings without leave from that court or a separate one. These orders can be issued for a specific or indefinite period of time.
Origins of Iaasac Wunder Order
The Iaasac Wunder order is named after the plaintiff in Wunder v Irish Hospitals Trust (Supreme Court, unreported). However, this type of order was actually first seen in Keaveney v Geraghty [1965] IR 551.
In Riordan v Ireland (No.5) [2001] 4 IR 465, the High Court stated that the Irish courts have an inherent jurisdiction to make these orders “where the court is satisfied that a person has habitually or persistently instituted vexatious or frivolous civil proceedings.”
In Ruth Moran v Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of Ireland [2019] IECA 90, the Court of Appeal endorsed this finding, and stated that Iaasac Wonder orders “preserve the subjects constitutional right of access to the courts and merely requires that it be exercised only where they can satisfy the President of the High Court that they ought to be permitted to bring the particular intended proceedings”.
Criteria for an Iaasac Wunder Order
In Burke v Judge Fulhan [2010] IEHC 448, the court set out the grounds which must be present before an Iaasac Wunder order can be granted. These are:
1. The Plaintiff is bringing proceedings which have already been determined;
2. It is obvious that the action cannot succeed;
3. The action was brought for an improper purpose including harassment;
4. The rolling forward of issues into subsequent actions;
5. The whole history of proceedings;
6. Failure to pay costs of previous actions;
7. Conduct of the parties
The case of Deirdre Morgan v The Labour Court and Others was ground-breaking because, for the first time, the High Court considered whether Iasaac Wunder relief could be extended to statutory tribunals such as the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC).
Prohibiting WRC or Labour Court Proceedings
On 15 June 2015, the Minister for Education decided to remove Deirdre Morgan from office.
Deirdre Morgan failed to challenge her removal from office until nearly a year later when, on 09 June 2016, she eventually lodged two complaints with the WRC against the Minister and the Education and Training Board. The Adjudication Officer dismissed both complaints on the grounds that they were out of time. These determinations were upheld by the Labour Court on appeal.
For the next six years, Deirdre Morgan persistently made complaints to the WRC and initiated court proceedings against the Minister and the Board in relation to their decision to remove her from office.
As a result, the Minister and the Board eventually decided to seek Iaasac Wunder orders, in order to prevent Deirdre Morgan from initiating any more proceedings against them in the courts or in any other forum, including the WRC, without first obtaining leave from the High Court to do so.
Granting an Iaasac Wunder Order
In his judgement, Ferriter J stated that the rationale for granting an Iaasac Wunder order is to “protect the integrity of the administration of justice by providing a filter to weed out the issue and prosecution of proceedings where such proceedings would amount to an abuse of process”. However, Ferriter J acknowledged that there was a lack of Irish case law addressing whether or not these orders could be granted in respect of proceedings being brought before statutory tribunals such as the WRC.
In determining whether or not such orders could be granted, Ferriter J examined case law from the UK. The UK have their own version of the Iaasac Wunder order, known as Civil Restraint Orders (CROs) which have been used to prevent proceedings being brought before English Employment Tribunals.
In his judgement, Ferriter J referred to the English case of Nursing and Midwifery Council v Harrold. In this case Hamblem J. had stated that “there is clearly a need for inferior courts to be protected from vexatious proceedings, just as there is for the High Court to be so protected”.
Furthermore, in Law Society of England and Wales v Sheikh, Jay J. commented that he was “entirely satisfied that the court has an inherent jurisdiction in this sort of case to impose its coercive or injunctive powers on a vexatious litigant if she persists, without reasonable cause, in litigation in an inferior tribunal”.
Prior Decisions of WRC and Labour Court
Ferriter J concluded that the High Court’s jurisdiction to make orders to stop the abuse of justice in statutory tribunals such as the WRC was “arguably on a stronger constitutional footing in light of the provisions of Articles 34 and 37 of the Constitution and the supervisory role of the High Court to ensure that proceedings of statutory tribunals are conduced in accordance with law”.
He also noted the “broad original jurisdiction” of the High Court to make sure that tribunal proceedings are carried out in a manner which is consistent with law. He concluded that the High Court could grant Iaasac Wunder orders to prevent claims being brought before the WRC in the absence of leave from the High Court.
Ferriter J continued to say that in the present case it was “manifestly appropriate” to grant an Iaasac Wunder order on the grounds that Deirdre Morgan had habitually and persistently instituted proceedings in the WRC and the courts in relation to her removal from office. She had continued to do this despite the fact that the issues in question had been the subject of numerous binding and conclusive prior decisions.
Ferriter J noted that Deirdre Morgan had “repeatedly engaged in the vexatious re-packaging of claims already determined against her. Indeed, she made clear to the Court during the hearing of the various matters before me that she intended to continue her campaign of proceedings.”
Takeaways
What employers can take away from this decision is that an Iaasac Wunder order may be available to them if an employee (present or former) persistently initiates proceedings against them in the WRC despite the fact that the issues in question have already been the subject of “binding and conclusive decisions”.
The Courts will not look favourably on a plaintiff who repeatedly initiates “manifestly vexatious claims” and places a significant strain on the Court’s time or resources.
