Defining Disability under Irish Employment Law
For an employee to prove a claim of discrimination, under Irish employment equality legislation, they must first demonstrate that they have a “disability” within the meaning of section 2 of the Employment Equality Act.
furthermore, they must demonstrate on medical evidence that they had a “disability” within the meaning of the Employment Equality Act and that the employer was on notice of same.
Defining a Disability under Irish Legislation
“Disability” is defined in the Employment Equality Act as:
(a) the total or partial absence of a person’s bodily or mental functions, including the absence of a part of a person’s body,
(b) the presence in the body of organisms causing, or likely to cause, chronic disease or illness,
(c) the malfunction, malformation or disfigurement of a part of a person’s body,
(d) a condition or malfunction which results in a person learning differently from a person without the condition or malfunction, or
(e) a condition, illness or disease which affects a person’s thought processes, perception of reality, emotions or judgement or which results in disturbed behaviour, and shall be taken to include a disability which exists at present, or which previously existed but no longer exists, or which may exist in the future or which is imputed to a person.
Defining a Disability under Irish Case Law
In Waterford Senior Care Limited v Liam Tabb [Determination No. EDA 1926; ADE/19/5], the Labour Court highlighted the importance of determining at the outset of a disability discrimination claim whether a person had a “disability” within the meaning of the Employment Equality Act at the material time. The Court emphasised that the burden is on a person bringing a disability discrimination claim to prove on medical evidence that he has a disability. In finding that the Complainant did not have a disability, the Court held:
“There is a burden upon the Appellant to specify how any such condition conforms to the definition of disability within the meaning of the Act. It is not for the Court to speculate or draw upon its own interpretation of such terms. The Appellant, in not supplying any medical evidence which would allow the Court to consider the medically certified condition of the Appellant at the material time against the criteria set out in Section 2 of the Act, has left the Court with no basis for determining that any of the conditions specified by his medical practitioner amounted to a condition meeting the terms of the Act at Section 2. The Court concludes that it is not in a position to determine that the Appellant suffered from a disability within the meaning of the Act at the material time and consequently must find that the within appeal cannot succeed.”
In the case of An Post v Stephens [DEC-E2018-005], the Labour Court addressed the law in relation to the duty to reasonably accommodate. The Labour Court stated that:
“In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the onus is on the Complainant to prove that she had a disability at a time material to her claim or that one was imputed to her. The Court must decide whether the condition from which the Complainant suffered is a disability within the statutory meaning ascribed to that term. That is a mixed question of law and fact which turns on the true construction of paragraph (e) of the definition of disability contained at section 2 of the Act and the application of that definition to the facts as admitted or as found by the Court.”
In Stephens, the Complainant alleged that she suffered from a condition of agoraphobia, but the Respondent confirmed that it had not been on notice of that condition at the material time. The Court concluded:
“Based on the uncontroverted medical evidence tendered in this case, the Court must find that the condition from which the Complainant alleged she suffered from does not amount to a disability within the statutory meaning. Therefore, the Court finds that the Complainant has not established a prima facie case and in circumstances where reasonable accommodation was in fact provided to her, the Court does not find that the Respondent was in breach of Section 16 of the Act. Accordingly, the claim herein must fail”.
Notifying Employer of Disability
Similarly, in the case of Houses of The Oireachtas v Thomas Hickey [Determination No. EDA1918; ADE/19/6], the Labour Court found that the employee in that case did not suffer from a disability. In relying upon the CJEU cases of Chacon Navas v Eurest (C-13/05) and Ring v Dansk (C35/11), the Court found that no disability existed. At paras. 14 – 17 the Court held:
“No medical report was opened to the Court to establish clearly and unequivocally the extent and the duration of the Complainant’s illness or that that illness was a chronic illness within the meaning of paragraph (b) of the definition of “disability” for the purposes of the Act… Having regard to all of the foregoing, the Court finds that the Complainant has not established a prima facie case that he had a disability within the meaning of the Act. For that reason, the appeal succeeds and the decision of the Adjudication Officer is set aside in full.”
An employee filing a complaint, citing a disability, is required to produce medical evidence to establish that she had a disability at the material time and the extent of any alleged disability.
Further, an employee is further put on full proof of their notification to their employer of a disability.
In A Worker v An Employer EDA 1927, the Labour Court stated that the Respondent was “not provided with any medical evidence that the Complainant had a disability” and that the Respondent “could not have been expected to accept the Complainant’s assertions in the absence of medical evidence”.
Takeaway
An employee, in pursuing a claim of disability discrimination under the Employment Equality Act, needs to ensure that they suffer a “disability” within the meaning of section 2 of the Employment Equality Act and that they have notified their employer of same.
